The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Volume 3
Issue 3 January

Article 8

January 1976

Humanism as Demystification
Alfred McClug Lee
City University of New York

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw
Part of the Social Psychology and Interaction Commons, and the Social Work Commons

Recommended Citation
McClug Lee, Alfred (1976) "Humanism as Demystification," The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare:
Vol. 3 : Iss. 3 , Article 8.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol3/iss3/8

This Article is brought to you by the Western Michigan
University School of Social Work. For more information,
please contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.

1

HUMANIS( AS DEMYSTIFICATION
by ALFRED McCLUG LEE, Professor of Sociology Emeritus, Brooklyn
College and the Graduate School, The City University of New York

Under a variety of labels, many academic disciplines focus
on the unsettling impact of fresh and vivid interpersonal experiences
upon pre-existing beliefs and behaviour patterns. Reference is to
philosophical discussions of sophism and humanism, historical theories about frontier influences, anthropological interest in culture
shock, psychiatric concern with empathy and with perceptive listening, and sociological analyses of marginality, uses of participant
observation and life-history data, and clinical studies of social
behavior. Their significant similarity is that they are all discussions of demystifying influences on social thought and action.
They are demystifying in the sense that they tend to translate the
distant, the abstract, into immediate, specific, and personal terms.
They throw traditional patterns into contrast with what is here and
now and with quite different traditional formulations.
When this demystifying impact can be constructively absorbed,
it moves individuals from--even tears them out of-a cultural context.
It furnishes opportunities for the re-examination of value commitments, of ways of viewing oneself and others, of ways of behaving.
It draws attention 'to the relative, unstable and conflicting character of political institutions, social usages, religious beliefs and
even moral standards and ideals.'
It makes for greater creativity
and cosmopolitanism--when it is constructively absorbed. It can
stimulate others to pointless cynicism or rebellion.
One of the two fragments remaining from the extensive writings of Protagoras of Abdera is often said to encapsulate the fifth
century B.C. humanist and sophist viewpoint:
'Nan is the measure
of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the nonexistence of things that are not.'
The first clause of this statement in particular has been echoed down through the ages by humanists
as well as by their critics. In contrast with his own commitment to
essences and absolutes, Plato quotes Socrates as speaking satirically
about sophists. He said they argued out of the 'superfluity of their
wits.' Plato also has Socrates caustically pontificate that for
Protagoras-secretly, among his own disciples only and not in statements 'to the common heW.'
'all things are said to be relative
* . . out of motion and change and admixture all things are becoming
relatively to one another, which "becoming" is by us incorrectly
called being, but is eally becoming, for nothing ever is, but all
things are becoming.'
This Platonic sneering, this anti-intellectualism,
is a sample of the innuendos with which elitist philosophers have tried
to destroy the teachings of such sophist as Protagoras, the one who

'gave a philosophic basis to Democracy.'
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Who were these people? Those called sophists, the 'wise ones,' came
to Athens some five centuries before our era and then later to Alexandria
chiefly from the Greek frontiers in Ionia (Asia Minor) and Magna Graecia
(South Italy). The settlers on those frontiers were adventurers and fugitives from wars against invaders of Greece. Generations there had had
culture-stripping and culture-rebuilding experiences in their relations
with diverse tribes. They had had direct participation in social change
-in other words, clinical experiences with social and cultural reorganization-thrust upon them. This gave to at least a few a creative marginality in their intellectual stances, especially when they went to the
great centers of commerce and learning. Theirs was intelligence coloured
by culture shock, a reflection of perceptive listening to others from quite
different backgrounds. They had participated in expanding trade and colonization, and in diverse personal intimacies that included exogamy. For
them, traditional tribal values had been mediated or replaced by more cosmopolitan interpersonal and community identifications. The main mission of
the sophists, as it appears in retrospect, 'was to teach, to clear up the
mind of Greece, to put an end to bad myths and unproven cosmogonies, to
turn thought into fruitful paths. . . . The whole movement was moral as
well as intel ectual, and was singularly free from . . . corruption and
lawlessness.'
Toward the gods, the sophists could be at least agnostic.
As Protagoras put it, 'With regard to the gods I cannot feel sure either
that they are or that they are not, nor what they are like in figure; for
there are many things that hinder sure knwledge, the obscurity of the
subject and the shortness of human life.'
Protagoras's ideas were as outrageous to the Platonists as they
have been ever since to anxious seekers after dependable bases for authority
upon which to erect controlling and controllable ideologies. 'The truly
modern attitude towards most questions singularly resembles the general
point of view of the Sophists. It has taken humanity well over two thousand years to recover from the influence of8 post-Sophistic thought and to
get back into this salutary frame of mind.'
Sophist ideas, such as
those mentioned, contain the main thrusts of humanizing experiences, the
experiences which have from time to time in human history contributed such
invigorating and demystifying impacts upon social thought.
During its long subsequent history in social thought, humanism
as a term has shared the following characteristics with those used to
label other major generalities: It is shiftly, and it is sticky. It
has had many definitions. It has been alleged to adhere to almost all
sorts of other ideas, and it has also been shown to be opposed to each
of them-whatever it was! These problems of the term can best be seen by
realizing that it most accurately labels not a body of doctrine but a
kind of mind-changing social experience. It is a recurrent ingredient
in social movements, not a specific idea or social philosophy .

Basic to this sense of humanism as humanizing experience are oneto-one confrontations and then friendships with quite different sorts of
people. It depends upon those relationships being continuing enough and
egalitarian enough to result in the development of a degree of efficiency
in intercommunication and at the same time of a reciprocated ability to
empathize. Granted such relatively intimate contacts, this type of experience tends to dissipate notions of personal and group superiority. It
opens new perspectives on human talent and worth. It can even reveal to
those who are patient the human bases upon which mankind has been stumblingly developing the beginnings of participant democracy.
Humanism has figured in a wide range of religious, political,
and academic movements. As such, it has been identified with atheism,
capitalism (especially of the laissez-faire brand), classicism, communism,
democracy, egalitarianism, naturalism, positivism, pragmatism, rTativism,
and
science, scientism, socialism, statism, symbolic-interactionism,
supernaturalism, including versions of ancient paganism, Hinduism, Buddhism,
Judaism, Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, and Mohammedanism. It has also
been rationalized as being opposed to each of these. It has served as an
ingredient in movements against each. And these terms do not at all suggest
all of humanism's ideological and social associations.
That humanism has had so many adventures is, on the one hand, a
tribute to the persistent human inclination to suspect or to perceive
that the problems of life are actually human responsibilities-for
better or for worse. This recurring tendency, on the other hand, has
preoccupied generations of theorizers who have tried to anaesthetize
the humanistically tempted into depending rather upon either a supernatural agency or, as that imagery has grown pale, upon an all-controlling
natural order far beyond human control or manipulation.
When defined as simply and as etymologically as possible,
humanism refers to 'thought or action in which huma 1 interests, values,
It is thus a
and dignity are taken to be of primary importance.'
preoccupation with what is most relevant, significant, and important
to human beings. It is concerned primarily with individuals, with
human e.pression and creativity, with human society and socializing,
and with people's ability to persist and to flourish. This kind of
thinking has emerged and has had great influence at times when international migrations and commerce were bringing people of diverse backgrTunds into close contact with one another-in situations of participant observation and of perceptive listening.
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Along with supernaturalism and naturalism, humanism has been called
Notions of
'one of three rival claimants to philosophic allegiance.'
anthropomorphic agency, notions of an unconscious and automatically acting
natural system, and notions of humanism are three germinal threads that
run through recorded human thought. Each implies a basis for its own
authentication as well as a criterion for the rejection, reinterpretation,
or incorporation of the two others. Since social theorists so often find
it plausible and rewarding to mix two or three of these threads, their
separate characters are difficult to detect, spell out, and uiscuss. To
a degree, it must be done--if it is to be done at all-rather arbitrarily,
in terms of ideal types. At any rate, in its simplest notion, humanism
humanism as a fresh and more accurate expression of interpersonal experience
typically has implicaticns unsettling to the status quo in any society. It
is critical of and often antagonistic to both supernaturalism and naturalism
in their myriad forms. Esnecially in this century, humanism provides bases
to criticize the dehumanizing and epersonaljing implications of both the
When humanist perceptions
natural sciences and absolutist metaphysics.
are absorbed into a supernatural or a nature-centered ideology, they lose
this annoyingly critical potential. In such an unstable mix, the composite
can appear to become a prop for the status quo.
Supernaturalism concerns itself with ways to cope with aleatory
elements in life through providing recourses to magical, spiritual, or
divine powers. In doing so, it offers explanations of life ani nature
that go beyond objective verification through sense experiences, that
develop notions of a more or less integrated supernatural agency rationally in control and available for special dispensations to those satisfying the prescriptions of the related cult. Verification arises from fantasies, dogmatic claims, and coincidences. On such bases, adherents have
erected poetic and powerful structures of theory, ritual 14 organization,
With the
enticing promises and services, and thus social control.
growth of democratic ana scientific tendencies, supernaturalists have
also taken up selected naturalistic rhetorics. This is an attempt to
cope with the critical and anti-authoritarian potentials of' existential
humanism. Religion thus tecomes identifiea with human welfare on earth
as well as in the hereafter, an: scientific findings are claimed to be
congruent with newly re-ratipalized divine laws. In this latter sense,
"
'natural law' is divine law. '
Naturalism focuses upon the perception of nature ana the discovery of nature's laws. In this perspective, even though it be that
of an enterprise necessarily carried on by and presumably for people,
men and women have no special places within it. They are merely members
of a passing animal species, sometime parasites on a small planet.
Individual advocates of naturalism, in order to soften tne starkness
of the view they put forward, often suggest identities and relationships
with supernaturalism and humanism. Impersonal nature thus becomes
slightly anthropomorphized into something 'not too different' aE it were
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from 'enlightened views of divinity.' They may even use the term, God.
Curiously enough, that anti-humanist advocate of naturalistic determinism, the psychologist B.F. Skinner, has so rationalized his behaviouristic position that he was hailed as '1972 Humanist of the Year' by1,
religious body calling ityslf the American Humanist Association.
'What is being abolished [by the natureIn Skinner's philosophy,
centered] is autonomous man-the inner man, the homunculus, the possessing demon, the man defended by the literatures of freedom and dignity.'
He approves this effort and has joined it as one of its leaders. Just
how such a dedication can be squared with something to be called 'religious
humanism,' with human aspirations and humanizing experiences, it is difficult to understand. Since people are admittedly parasites on a small
planet, their preoccupation has to be with the needs of people in confrontation with cosmic pjgcesses, not merely with acquiescing to the mandates
of those processes.
Both naturalism and humanism are necessarily based on scientific findings, as principal current exponents of both now contend. To
emphasize this point, many humanists like to refer to themselves as
scientific or naturalistic humanists in order t 9 avoid confusion with
'humanists.' The term
Roman Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, or academic
naturalistic humanism does not at all imply an acceptance of such a
position as that of Skinner. Both the nature-centered and the peoplecentered theorists interpret scientific findings in terms of their own
needs and aspirations. The egalitarian and libertarian temptations of
humanist experiences and their demonstration of the relativity of values
to individual, group, and changing subculture and culture scare many
psychologically and socially insecure people. Like supernaturalism,
nature-centeredness places responsibility outside the individual, outside of humanity. The will of God becomes the consequence of natural
processes as perhaps revealed by 'the utterly imperg 8 nal problem solutions
naive statement
of the computer,' to quote R. Buckminster Fuller's
of faith. Fuller then adds: 'Only to their superhuman range of calculative
I political, scientific, and religious leaders
capabilities can and may
face-savingly acquiesce.'
Humanism is heady stuff. As social experience, it can tempt thoughtful men and women to throw into question their cultural heritage of supernaturalism or nature-centeredness as an exclusive or predominant frameof-reference for thought and action. When they attempt to do so, however,
they often try to carry along as much of their previous intellectual baggage
as they can, and this often confuses their new orientation to life and living. Compromise statements compound themselves and eliminate the controversial and even revolutionary aspects of the humanist temptation. Belief
in the controlling power of the supernatural is so great that many skeptical
theorists, with li~le or no faith in a deity themselves, agree with
(1469-1527) that 'there is no greater indication of
Nicolo Machiavelli
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the ruin of a country than to see religion condemned.' He asserted that,
with rulers maintaining religious forms in a convincing manner, 'it is easy
to keep their people religious, and consequently well conducted and united.'
It was only with the emergence of a statist need for unity in spite of
religious diversity that that child of the eighteenth century Enlightenment,
the United States of America, finally 2 1dopted the separation of church and
Thomas Jefferson, the provision's
state as a constitutional principle.
main sponsor, had reduced divinity in his own thinking to abstract naturalism labeled theism. Actually, in effect, a secular religion of statism
was to replace such awkward and outworn instruments of control as the
Church of England. As is currently evicenced by the religious-sectarian
colourations of struggles in Northern Ireland, in Canada, and even
in the English and Scottish industrial cities, the British have yet to
follow that United States precedent; as imperfectly implemented as it is
in the 2 J nited States, it has freed the country from much anguish in such
terms.
As has been indicated, the dawn of the historical meanderings of
humanism is usually placed, for lack of more ancient documentation, in
the Greece of the fifth century before our era. As taught by the sophists,
humanism gave much of Greek literature its people-centered and univeral
character. After humanism's great days in Athens and in Alexandria,
its second and more continuing center, there are jumps to the Muslim and
Jewish flowerings in North Africa during the fourteenth century and to
Italy during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Greek learning and
the findings of such inveterate travelers, readers, and commentators
as Ibn Batuta and Ibn Khaldun made the 2 9orth Africans a bridge between
the humanist past and the Renaissance.
Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio,
and others expressed humanist views in part through reviving interest
in the GrIk classics and in part through their own imageries and
theories.
But in those periods, in the Englightenment of the eighteenth
century, and in recent humanist-oriented literature, painting, philosophy,
social science, and even 'religion,' humanism has resisted thoroughgoing conceptualization as a philosophical system. It has not yielded
such systemic constructs as have supernaturalism and naturalism. On
the contrary, it has frequently intruded on such system-building and
unsettled or even destroyed it. This demonstrates the critical and
processual character of humanizing experiences and humanist philosophizings. It is accurately and inclusively seen as an intellectual and social
process. It is a consequence of intimate exposure to diverse types of human beings. It arises out of human empathy and sympathy, out of an awareness of common humanity and a common fate. It is an unfoldiing of a
knowledge and appreciation of AV a concern for human affairs 2 hrough
direct practical or 'clinical'"
e perience in social change.
This may all seem very- weil when viewed historically and in
rather abstract terms. vhat ioes it mean in social thought touay?
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Why is humanism still so controversial even among students of human sciences
such as sociology and social psychology? What does it do to the security
some of us find in pretentious methodologies, fancy terminologies, and
elegant theoretical constructs? Let us get at these questions by looking
briefly at five somewhat related social developments, all called 'humanist.'
These are: (1) liberal humanism, (2) Marxian communism, (3) 'religious'
humanism, (4) humanistic psychology, and (5) humanist sociology. It is
useful to discuss the first two-liberal humanism and Marxian communism-as background for the other three-'religious' humanism, humanistic psychology, and humanist sociology-because the latter arose out of the former
and have problems somewhat similar to them. Thes8 is no point in oiTj
going so far afield as to discuss Roman Catholic
and Protestant
'humanism.' It would be much more relevant to add a discussion of the impact
of humanizing experiences on painters and of' humanist fine art upon social
perception generally. From Pieter Bruegel (1525-1569), El Greco (Domenikos
Theotocopoulos, 1541-1614), William Hogarth (1697-1764), and Francisco
de Goya (1746-1828) to Diego Rivera (1886-1957) among the many great
moderns (including newspaper cartoonists-to mention only a few superb
examples-the record is most impressive.
1. Liberal humanism became, in the nineteenth century, a recourse
of intellectuals who were repelled both by communism and by naturalistic
evolutionism as a justification for unbridled "free enterprise" capitalism
as well as by supernaturalism. The position was and is a complicated one.
It is compounded of values traditionally embedded in European-American
middleclass ideals. These values glorify compromise, gradualism, civil
liberties, and fair play. They are the values of those w
would be both
societal stabilizers and surrogates of societal morality.
In consequence, its adherents find its more outspoken and critical exponentsalbeit non-communist and non-capitalist-extremist--difficult bed fellows.
Illustrations of such thorny spokesmen are Anatole France (Antole Francois
Thibault, 1844-1910). By contrast with their more culture-bound contemporaries, they help to characterize liberal humanism. Others who would
be equally useful as examples are John Dewey (1859-1952), Thomas Mann
(1875-1955), Albert Einstein (1879-1955), and Albert Carus (1913-1960),
to mention but a few of the many.
France and Twain had had deep and varied humanizing experiences that led them to rethink radically the views they had received
as to man's lot and then to bespeak their criticisms of society and
of man as they found them. Neither was handicapped much by formal education. France finally did pass his examinations for the university
laureate, but his preparation was largely informal; he browsed in his
father's bookstore and talked with all sorts of people in Parisian
cafes and streets. Twain, on the other hand, was a gradeschool dropout who educated himself in newspaper shops, river boats, bars, billiard
parlors, and mining camps, and through all sorts of reading. As each
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grew older, his disillusionment with the status cuo and his compassion
for the oppressed and for all mankind increased. Each criticized not
only avowe; upholders of outworn social institutions but also other liberal
humanists who took compromising stances. Toward the end, France even
turrfed his back upon liberalism and became a communist. As human affairs
have grown more chaoticim this century, liberal humanists have multiplied
in numbers, and many have become increasingly caustic and radical. (For
a recent list of leading humanists Ao labelea, see the international
signers of "Humanist Manifesto II.
)
In the great French tradition of Rabelais, Montaigne, Moliere,
Voltaire, and Renan, France gloried in his skepticism. As he saw it,
'The word is used as synonymous with negation and futility. But our
great skeptics were often the most affirmative and courageous of men.
They repudiate only negations. They attack those who trammel intelligence and will. They fight against ignorance which debases, against
error which oppresses, against hate which kills. . . . The most skeptical
of thinkers, meditating on the futility of the eternal flux of the universal, on the ineffectualness of poor mankind and on the absurd sufferings
which it inflicts on itself during its brief, dreamlike existence, are
filled with a profound compassion for their fellows. From this compassion
to a fraternal love is but a single step. Their pity is stirred, and
those who believe themselves forever detached from everyhing lose themselves in the combat to rescue their unhappy brothers.'
Such was the
credo and apologia pro suavita of one of the greatest of French novelists,
the author of Penguin Islad 1908) and of The Revolt of the Angels (1914),
a staunch defender of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, and an opponent of World
War I. Interestingly enough, both France and Twain were authors of books
dealing with Joan of Arc-as was that other skeptical humanist, George
Bernard Shaw. Her glorification of the human spirit, her willingness to
confront the decadence of church and state, thrilled them all.
In a sense, Twain was the greatest and most authentic product
in literature of the American frontier. As background for him, it is
instructive
think of the significant parallel drawn by the historian
F. J. Turner
'What the Mediterranean Sea was to the Greeks, breaking the bond of custom, offering new ecperiences, calling out new
institutions and activities, that, and more, the ever retreating frontier
has been to the United States directly, and to the nations of Europe
more remotely.'
Life France, Twain built his popular fame upon his virtuosity
as a storyteller. His thoroughgoing people-centeredness was the special
ingredient withyhich he, like France, permeated all of his writings.
As with France,
liain's skepticism made any intellectuals and even
many liberal humanists react unfavorably.3
The author of Tom Sawyer
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(1876) and Huckleberry Finn (181)

also wrote What Is Man? (1904) and

The Mysterious Stranger (1916),
two books that emphasize the profundiw of his 'children's books.' As the leading analyst of Twain's
work
notes, 'He was not merely the artist of American youth and the
past; he was surely our most mature and wisest of artists whose acerbity and profundity alike were ringed about with the imperishable
comic spirit. In his age he only became freer, bolder, more open
and honest, more emancipated both socially and sexually, from the taboos
of his epoch which, at base, his spirit had never accepted."
Many of those who have attempted in this century to shape what
they call secular and liberal humanism differ from such "irresgpnsible"
writers as France and Twain. The philosopher F.C.S. Schiller 4" (1864-1937
tried to create an academically respectable humanism. He identified his
doctrine as a variant of pragmatism, the movement launched by Charles S.
Peirce (1839-1914) and William James (1842-1910). His humanism 'was
essentially,' as he said, 'a protest against the dehumanizing and depersonalizing procedure which seemed to characterize both the natural sciences
and absolutist metaphysics.' He located his metaphysics "intermediate..
. between naturalism and supernaturalism" and came to substitute the term
voluntarism for humanism as a label for his philosophy. On the other hand,
such writers as the essayist Paul Elmer More (1864-1937) and the scholar
Irving Babbitt (1865-1933) shied away from the unsettling egalitarian
implications of humanism. Both preoccupied themselves with the problem of
order and its maintenance in social relations. They sought compulsions
toward such order in mystical inner experiences similar to those of

religious devotees but stimulate1 2 nontheologically by tradition, interpersonal relations, and thought.
The contributions of Schiller, More,
and Babbitt to the humanist movement in social thought have thus not been
weighty.
2. Marxian communism had among its humanist starting points
G.F.W. Hegel's 'exaltation of man's endeavor "to understand the world,
to appropriate and subdue it to himself"' I his 'clear willingness to
commit the sin of pride on behalf of man.'
It also owed much to Karl
Marx's own awareness of how the proletariat had performed during the
French Revolution. Marx observed that the proletariat no longer need be
written off as dependent and deferential. He took it to be the aggressive
and dependable instrument for the revolutionary otherthrow of capitalism.
The increasingly popular appeal of natural science and its freedom
from ecclesiastical controls apparently made naturalism most enticing to
Marx. In his early exuberance, he asserted: 'Communism as a fully develope
naturalism is humanism and as a fully developed humanism is naturalism.
It is the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and nature,
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and between man and man.' 4 4 He arrived at this view by claiming that
'atheism is humanism mediated to itself by the annulment of religion,
while communism is humanism mediated to itself by the annulment of
religign, while communism 9 humanism mediated to itself by the annulAt this early stage, Marx thus appears
ment of private property.'4
to be people-centered and not yet to have moved on to a nature-centered
societal determinism. It was in this early period of humanist pre- 4 6
occupation that Marx and Engels wrote their famous German Ideology,
based upon 'men, not in any fantastic isolation or abstract definition,
but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development
under definite conditions.' This v~jw made history cease for them
to be 'a collection of dead facts.' "
Two involvements appear to have diverted Marx from following out fully and without compromise implications of a people-centered
orientation. These were (1) his vocation as an agitator for social
and (2) his evident conviction that human considerations do not
change
provide in themselves adequate bases for ideological authority or allegiance,
that he also needed-or had to accept-what he took to be the mandates of
an overriding scientific naturalism.
Marx's vocational complication led him to such contentions as
that the revolution of the proletariat should best and most likely begin
in the British Isles. As he asserted: 'The English have all the material
prerequisites necessary for the social revolution. What they lack is
the spirit of generalization and revolutionary fervour.' He predicted
that an Irish re,1t would provide the starting point and leverage for
that revolution.&
A more intimate knowledge of English humanity and
its accumulated and internalized social controls would have made him far
less optimistic in his assessment of his vocatio al opportunities to
That communist
agitate revolution successfully in that country.9
revolutions would succeed in such relatively undeveloped countries industrially as Russia and China was apparently not seriously entertained by
Marx and Engels.
Once Marx had mixed nature-centeredness or nature-determinism and
its imperatives (as he saw them) with his humanism and had given them
greater weight than the people-centered, he visualized historical processes as having sufficient precedence over individual rights and wishes to
achieve the transformations of society he thought to be necessary. This
gave hj philosophy a kind of dehumanizing determinism in his more 'mature'
phase.
As he summarizes its, his dialectical process 'regards every
historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore
takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary
existence; . .

.

impase upon it, and it is in its essence
it lets noting
'2

critical and revolutionary.
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Nurtured by such skeptics as France and Twain and by such revolutionary theorists as Marx and Engels, humanism survives in an increasingly objective and radical form to become the significant ingredient
in European-American intellectual currents. Three of its developments,
now to be briefly examined, have many of the problems of both liberal
These problems are chiefly the temptations of
and Marxian humanism.
scientistic naturalism and of the forcing of a redefinition of the

middleclass molds in which many of humanism's spokesmen have been shaped
and thus intellectually limited and even distorted.
3. Religious humanism is an organizational offshoot of liberal
humanism, born chiefly of a need felt by educated parents to provide their
children with a substitute for supernaturalist church schools. It has
grown as a friendly heresy within the Unitarian-Universalist denomination.
In addition to those congregations and fellowships of the Unitarian-Universalist denomination which are avowedly humanist, religious humanism's most
eccelsiastical manifestations are the Ethical Culture Societies and the
53
local units of the American Humanist Association.
As with Marxians, many religious humanist spokesmen have both naturedeterminist and vocational biases. These biases complicate even further
their middleclass anxiety to be respectably plausible to many people and
to gain a kind of legitimacy through identifying with societal morality
as they interpret it, a morality of the 'future.'
Reference has already been made to the nature-centered bias
exhibited in an official act of the American Humanist Association.
Readers of that organization's periodical, The Humanist, which is also
the organ of the Ethical Culture Socoties, find it to be a persistent
as a respected leader of the
theme. In contrast, Curtis W. Reese
general movement clearly observes that religious humanism 'has withstood
tons of volumes designed to show how man is in the grip of fate, or subject to the iron law of physical determinism, or molded by purposes of
which he is unaware, or blown like a broken reed by the winds of the centuries.' He affirms that 'the nature of the world is such that human
intention and activity may play the determining role in human enterprise,
subject only to the conditioning factors of the environing situation.'
The vocational bias of religigs humanists is a more subtle problem.
to warn against bringing 'humanism
Concern with it leads Paul Blanshard
under the sentimental, all-purpose umbrella of religion.' He wants
humanists rather to dedicate themselves to the promotion of such useful
projects as birth control, including abortion at will, and legal equality
for unbelievers and to the struggle against parachiaid (tax support for
parochial schools) and prayer and Bible-reading in tax-supported schools.
He opposes such efforts as that of the philosopher J.H. Randall, Jr.
to expand the vocation of the religious humanist to include 'the humanistic
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interpretation of traditional religion.' Randall wants 'to bring into the
forefront the relatively humanistic core that has been overlaid with
supernatural ideas.' Perhaps even though such efforts as that proposed
by Randall are likely to be so sloppy as to be indefensible intellectually, they have their uses in social therapy, in the continuing struggles
to liberate the minds of people. 57
Religious humanist organizations have remained small, but their
their relations with the great humanist intellectual and social movements
and their contacts with organized religion have made them bridges of
interpretation. Their greater freedom to take up proposals for social
changes has made their spokesmen sources of ferment in religious thought
and social philosophy. They have thus helped to provide liberal humanism's
creative voices with broader audiences and with a degree of organizational
pressures.
support with which to withstand supernaturalist and other
4. Humanistic psychology is the creation of scientists influenced
by the liberal humanistic tradition and by their own humanizing experiences,
who have been nagged by questions of the relevance of their discipline's
findings to the solution of everyman's human problems. It has roots in
the pragmatism of Peirce and William James and in the psychic probings of
Sigmund Freud, his followers,and some of his antagonists. In part, it
became a reactiop against the biological determinism of such writers as
Julian S. Huxley9 who saw humanism as a call to man 'to do the best he
can to manage the evolutionary process on this planet and to guide its
future course in a desirable direction.' To accomplish this, he said,
'fuller realization of genetic possibilities becomes a major motivation
for man's efforts, and eugenics is revealed as one of the basic human
sciences.'
In a debate, Carl Rogers as one of the principal current proponents
of humanism in psychology agreed with B.F. Skinner 'that the whole question
of the scientific control of human behavior is a matter with which psychologists and the general public should concern themselves.' As the sciences
of biology and psychology develop, they are exhibiting frightening potentialities. Rogers focused his differences with Skinner on answers to these
questions: 'Who will be controlled? Who will exercise control? What type
Most important of all, toward what end or6 0
of control will be exercised?
what purpose, or in the pursuit of what value, will control be exercised? '
For Skinner, the answers to these questions lie within the mystique
of science and scientists. He asserted:
'I cannot quite agree that the
practice of science requires a prior decision about goals or a prior choice
of values.' Whether or not such a choice is required, he does not weigh
adequately the significance of the fact that such choice is made either
for or by the would-be scientist. It is never dodged. The unwitting
acceptance of culturally or organizationally set goals is scarcely to be
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condoned in social science as a basis for avoiding responsibility in the
name of an illusory value-free ethical principle. Skinner contends that
when we trust scientists the whole problem of the control of power is
really on its way to being solved for the greater good of human survival.
'If we are worthy of our democratic heritage we shall, of course, be ready 6 1
to resist any tyrannical use of science for immediate or selfish purposes.'
By the time such 'tyrannical use of science' becomes obvious to anyone,
however, controls developed by psychgiogists or biologists might well have
rendered mass resistance impossible.
On the other hand, Rogers is vividly aware that scientists are
people. He recalls how German rocket scientists worked for the Nazis
and then for whichever major power--U.S.S.R. or U.S.A.-captured them.
As Rogers notes, 'If behavioral scientists are concerned solely with
advancing their science, it seems most probable that they will serve the
purposes of whatever individual or group has the power.' In other words,
'the scientific control of human behavior' would be in grave danger of
'the denial, misunderstanding, or gross underestimation of the place of
ends, goals or values in their relationship to science.'
Rogers therefore
contends that the choice of values 'will forever lie outside the science
which implements them; the goals we select, the purposes we wish to follow,
must always be outside of the science which achieves them. To me this has
the encouraging meaning that the human person, with his capacity of subjective choice, can and will alwais exist, separate from and prior to any
of his scientific undertakings.' 3
So as not to make these comments on a complex and promising
humanist deylopment too long, another exponent can be quoted. Sidney
M. Jourard
contends:
'When researchers are transparently pledged to
further the freedom and self-actualizing of their subjects, rather than
be unwitting servants of the leaders of institutions, then they will
deserve to be and to be seen as recipients of the secrets of human being
and possibility.'
He adds: 'This is not the death of "objective," scientific
psychology. Rather, it may prove to
the birth of a scientifically informed psychology of human persons.'
5. Humanist sociology is not new.
Like humanistic psychology, it is an offspring of intimate interpersonal experiences, of
nagging problems of scientific relevance to everyman's human concerns,
of the liberal humanist movement, and of a scientific ethic dedicated
to the satisfaction of curiosity and of desire to serve people rather than
merely to build a profitable cult. Like liberal humanism generally, it
has had a constant struggle with the limiting influences of middleclass
ideals, mores, and organizations as well as with pressures from other
classes. It has also benefited from those ideals, mores, and organizations
as well as from those pressures, especially from the pressures of the less
well-placed classes. Those who have tried to push sociology toward a humanist orientation have had to confront the seductions of special interests,
of scientism, of sentimentality, of humane panaceas, of irrelevant but
prestigious methodologies, and of pretentious theoretical fretworks.
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life-hictoiry matfrials,
perceptive list(cning, and most effectively in the clinical study of
social qhavior through personal involvement in social planning and
action."o

In his famous stum of London at the end of the nineteenth
ggat contributions were not his statistics,
century, Charles Booth's
'but his realistic descriptions of the
according to Robert E. Park
actual life of the occup~tinnal classes -the conditions under which
they lived and labored, their passions, pastimes, domestic tragedies,
and the life-philosopiies with which each class met the crises peculiar
to it.' Booth's descriptions 'made these studies a memorable and a perma
nent contribution to our knowledge of human nature and of society.' Such
accurate and intimate data helped to demystify London slums; they made
moie realistic thinking about them possible.
Extensive participant observation, perceptive listening, and clinical experience in social action convinced W.I. Thomas that he could not
'believe in. . . comparisons between physics and sociology,' in other
words in scientism; 'you never have the same experimental control of a
situation.' The sociologist has to be satisfied with 'high degrees of
probability.' Thomas's studies of intimate life-histories and of their
contexts and his pnr-(,nal involvement in social struggles led him to that
demystification of sociological research that lent such distinction to
his career. To quote him again: 'The case study method and the "natural
history" method must not only precede the more scientifically acceptable
method in order to produce realistic hypotheses and indicate what units
should be defined and isolated; they must also be used as a genieral background of reference tn the more limited statistical findings, which lead
to inferences which must be constantly chg§ked for validity against
;he large mass of material not yet analyzable.'
Participant observation, perceptive listening, and experiential
involvement in social action are old, somewhat recognized, but difficult procedures to employ in social exploration, critical re-evaluation of
social theory, and theory modification. Basically, their advocates
counsel: Sit down and talk with people with quite different backgrounds
from your own. Then, and above all, see how they actually behave in
significantly challenging social action situations. Try to comprehend how
the other persons sense their lives, thoughts, social worlds. This takes
time, patience, and more than a little mind-stretching. Put aside as
much as you can, they suggest, the common exercise of self-congratulation
that you are not as your interviewees are-not so bound by tradition,
so stupid, so gullible, so mnipulated by tne mass media, so inadequate,
so 'disturbed,' so ' tholcgical.' As the advocates of these metlods
advise, try gently tc hulj informants fcrget their psychological barriers

against self-revelation. This can take place concomitantly with your own
breaking down of your own barriers against hearing and understanding in their terms-what those interviewed have to tell you. Then attempt
to conceive as well as you can what it would be like to be living those
other persons' lives. Sometimes this can only be done, to the extent that
it can be done, by working with them as equals to cope with mutually
recognized social problems.
How many have had mind-stretching experiences such as W.7 9. Whyte
in
went through when he was working on his Street Corner Society
South Boston? Recall what complicated procedures he planned for his
study, the research team he thought he would need, all the rest, and
then how instead he went into the field alone and began his clinical
study of the social behavior in which he came to participate. His head
many times ached from culture shock, but he learned far more than he
might have had he carried out his a priori plan of research. His book
vividly introduces its readers to the highly organized life of an ItaloAmerican neighborhood.
After such humanizing experiences, the stereotyped ideas with which
we 'handle' a different sort of person start to crumble. The black
business operator or migratory Chicano worker or American Indian militant
or even the colleague in a different specialty or status talks quite differently about many things than we do, but the longer and more candidly
we converse the more sense that talk makes. Through an egalitarian search
for common goals, males and females might open up new worlds of understanding of the other sex, but this does not often happen. We do not
enter into such a relationship in an egalitarian manner, and thus we do
not have opportunities to depart from stereotyped role patterns in our
speaking and hearing. We hold fast to our sex roles and sex stereotypes. A pimp or a thief or a homosexual or a drug pusher or a schizophrenic can reveal worlds of 'reality' that make our own worlds take on
surprisingly altered characters---social scientists though we might be.
No wonder that a whole rash of new discussions of psychotherapy exploits
the consequences of ne l1levels of perceptive listening to individual
problem-racked people.
What is so unusual about the humanizing experiences obtained in
participant observation, perceptive listening, and the clinical study
of social behavior? Are not at least the first two well entrenched
in the texts on social research methods? Are they not even something
of a current fad again in social problems research in spite of propaganda by scientistic positivists that they are more journalistic than
'scientific'? Why are these methods so consistently opposed or defined
into useless rigidity by proponents of scientism, commercialization,
and academic bureaucratization? Have not realistic novelists, careful
journalists, and ethnologists given these procedures vivid exemplification and interpretative validation for many years?
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The stress here is not just upon the usefulness of these procedures
in an occasional research project. They are basic to the processes of
humanizing and demystifying all social thought in a tradition that
stretches back to the Greek sophists. This is not at all to suggest
the rejection of such widely held scientific criteria as accuracy, representativeness, 7 elevance, internal consistency replictility, and clarity
of statement.
On the contrary, as Glenn Jacobs
points out,
'Such a view presumes a radical empiricism in place of scientism, a disciplined skepticism about any substitute for man as his own measure.'
Perceptive involvement in social action, with its products of culture
shock and intellectual marginality, is our basic humanizing and demystifying influence in social thought about people and society. Even specialists in ancient history or extinct languages see a new vibrancy in their
subjects from expanding their experiences with living individuals and
groups. The students of current social affairs who return from their
field work to their libraries and computers are not the same as the ones
who went forth. Fortunately, for all their simplicity and for all their
utter complexity, these humanizing procedures constantly press fresh
views of changing humanity and society upon the attention of those engaged
in thinking about the human lot.

-362-

Notes
1

Reprinted by permission of the Editor, Arun Sahay, from Sociological
Analysis & Theory, Vol. V, No.3 (October 1975).

The author is indebted for critical comments on this manuscript
by Sidney Aronson, Henry Etzkowitz, Howard and Lenore Henderson,
Mark Hutter, Glenn Jacobs, and Elizabeth Briant Lee. This paper was
read before the Irish Sociological Association, Dublin, April 4, 1975.
2

B.A.G. Fuller, 'Sophists,' Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, XIV

(1934), 259-261, at 259.
3

Quoted by Socrates in The Works of Plato: Abridged, ed. Irwin Edman
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 192-)-473.
41bid., 4745

Gilbert Murray, A History of Ancient Greek Literature (New York:
Appleton, 1897; re-issued: New York: Frederick Ungar Publ. Co.,

1966), 163.
6

1bid., 163-164.

7

Quoted by Moses Hadas, A History of Greek Literature (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1950)80.
8

Harry Elmer Barnes, An Intellectual and Cultural History of the
i975,131.
Western World, 3rd ed. rev. (New York: Dover-ublicatin,
9

A.McC. Lee, Toward Humanist Sociology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1973), ix-x11; Paul Blanshard, 'Communication,'
The Humanist, XXXIII, 2 (March-April 1973),36.
10

Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969).

11
The
(New
rev.
lish

Random House Dictiona of the English Language, col. ed.
York: Random House, 1968, 645; of. The Century Dictionary,
ed. (New York: Century Co., 1914), 2913, and The Oxford En
Dictionary, rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), I, 44.

-363-

1

E.P. Cheyney, 'Humanism,' Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,

VII (1932), 537-542, at 542.
13F.C.S. Schiller, 'Humanism,' Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,
VII (1932), 542-544, at 543.
14

Andrew D.

White, A History of the Warfare of Science With Theoi D. Appleton and C-., 1896), 2 vols.,
log in Christendom (New York:
W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller, The Science of Society (New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1927), II.
15

W. H. Coates and others, The Emergence of Liberal Humanism (New

York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966), Chap. Z.
16

Corliss Lamont, 'Highlights of the Humanist Movement,' The Humanist,

XXXV, I (January-February 1975), 52-53.
17

B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and

1971), 191.
18e e ,
8
Lee,

gt

(New York: Bantam Books,

'Communication', The Humidist, XXXIII, 1 (January-

February, 1973), 46.
19

The term, academic, is added because classicists and other
specialists in 'humane letters' have long been called 'humanists.'
This is an inheritance from the fifteenth century Italian distinction
between the study of the sacred (studia divinitatis) and of the
humane (studia humanitatis), the humanities. See Coates and others,
op.cit., 4.
2OR.

B. Fuller, Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth (Carbondale,

Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 199), 36.
2 1

Cf.

Lee, 'Garbage out,' in his Toward Humanist Sociology,

op.cit., 21-23.
22Niccolo Machiavelli, 'The Discourses,' trans. C.E. Ietmold, in:
The Prince and the Piscourses (New York: Modern Library, 1940),

149-150.
23.

L. Blau, ed., Cornerstones of Religious Freedom in America (Boston:

Beacon Press, 1949).

-364-

24

E. R. Clinchy, All in the Name of God (New York: John Day Co.,

1934.
25

Moses Hadas, op. cit., chap. 13.

26

G. E. von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam (Chicago: University of Chi-

cago Press, 1936); Franz Rosenthal, 'Ibn Khaldun's Life,' in Ibn
Khaldun, The Muaddimah, trans. Rosenthal (New York: Pantheon Books,
1958), I, xxix-lxvii.
27

Coates and others, op. cit., chap. 1.

28Reference here is not to a medical "clinic," but to a similarly
instructive, actual social situation.
29

Lee,

Multivalent Man (New York: George Braziller, 1966),

chap. 22.
30Jacques Maritain, Existence and the Existent, trans. Louis
Galantiere (New York: Random House, 1949).
31

Reinhold Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny of Man (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1949), I-II; Paul Tillich, Courage to Be (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1952).
32

Glenn Jacobs, 'Convergences of Artistic and Sociological Insight
in the Paintings of Pieter Bruegel,' Sociological Abstracts, XX, 6
(October 1972), xxv-xl.
33Lee,

1966, op. cit., part 2.

34

New York Times, August 26, 1973, 1, 51; Humanist Manifestos I
and II (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1973), 24-31.
35

Quoted by Jacob Axelrad, Anatole France (New York: Harper & Bros.,
1944), 427.

36

F. J. Turner, 'Significance of the Frontier in American History,'

1894, reprinted in his Frontier and Section, ed. R. A. Billington
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961), 37-62, at 62.

-365-

37

Henri Peyre, 'In Purgatory Still,' New York Times Book Reviewr,

December 17, 1967, 438Van Wyck Brooks, The Ordeal of Mark Twain (New York: E.P. Dutton
& Co., 1933), esp. chap. 1; Lewis Leary, ed., A Casebook of Mark
Twain's Wound (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1962).
39

Mark Twain, The Mysterious Stran__r, ed. W. M. Gibson (Berkeley:
University of Ca-lifornia Press, 1)69), This is a more authentic
edition than the original 1916 one.
40

Maxwell Geismar, Mark Twain: An American Prophet (Boston: Hough-

ton Mifflin Co., 1970), 536.
41Schiller, op. cit., 542-543.
42

Irving Babbitt, On Being Creative (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1932), esp. xi-xliv.

43W.

H. Coates and H.V. White, The Ordeal of Liberal Humanism

1970),

(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
44

232-233.

Karl Marx, Early Writings (1844-1846), trans. and ed. T.B.

Bottomore (London: C.A. Watts & Co., 1963),155.
451bid., 213.

46Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideolog" (1846),
trans. and ed. R. Pascal (London: Lawrence and Wishart,1939).

47Ibid., Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, ed. L.S. Feuer
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1959), 248.
48Lee, Toward Humanist Sociology, op. cit., chap. 3; 'Efforts at
Revolution in Ireland,' paper presented before American Sociological
Association, New York, N.Y., August 30, 1973.
49

Marx and Engels, Ireland and the Irish Question, ed. R. Dixon
(New York: International Publishers, 1972), 160-161.

-

-

50

Lee, 'Efforts at Revolution in Ireland,' op. cit.

51

Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 1873

(ChicagoT Charles H. Kerr
52

Co, 1904), 1113.

Italics added; Marx and Engels, 1959, op. cit., 146.

5

'Ethical Culture Societies tend to have programs of meetings resembling those of Christian churches; American Humanist Association
local units vary in program but usually have monthly speakers or
discussion sessions plus the work of action committees on social
concerns.
54

C.W. Reese, The Meaning of Humanism (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus
Books, 1945), 34; see also Mason Olds, 'John H. Dietrich: The
Father of Religious Humanism,' Journal of the Liberal Ministry,
XV, 1 (Winter 1975), 46-52.
55

Blanshard, op. cit.

56J. H. Randall, Jr., 'Communication,' The Humanist, XXXIII (MarchApril 1973), 36.
57

Lloyd and Mary Morain, Humanism as the Next Step (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1954); E. H. Wilson, 'Liberal Religion's Unfinished Business,'
Journal of the Liberal Ministry, XII, 3 (Fall 1972), 3-15.

58Corliss Lamont, The Philosophy of Humanism, 5th ed. (New York:
Frederick Ungar Publ. Co., 1965); Paul Kurz, ed., Moral Problems
in Contemporary Society, 2nd ed. (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
1973); Kurz, The Fullness of Life (New York: Horizon Press, 1974).

59

julian S. Huxley, Essays of a Humanist (New York: Harper & Row,
1964), 280.
60

B.F. Skinner and Carl Rogers, 'Some Issues Concerning the Control

of Human Behavior: A Symposium' (Reprinted from Science, November
30, 1956, 1057-1066) in J.F. Glass and J.R. Staude, eds., Humanistic
Society (Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear Publ. Co., 1972), 327-

349, at 335-336.

-367-

LIIbid., 345, 348.
62See Ulso Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Bantam
Books, 1971), and Walden Two (New York: Macmillan Co., 14j3).
63Skinner and Rogers, op. cit., 338, 345.
6

AS.M. Jourard, 'A Humanistic Revolution in Psychology,' 1968, in
Glass and Staude, op. cit., 15-19, at 18, 15.
65Ibid., Disclosing Man to Himself,

2nd ed. (Princeton: Van

Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1971); A.H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being,
2nd ed. (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1968), Motivation and Personality,
2nd ed (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), and The Further Reaches of
Human Nature (New York: Viking Press, 1971).
66

Lee, 1966, op. cit., chap. 22, Toward Humanist Sociology, op.
cit., chap. 2.
67Charles Booth, Labour and Life of the People (London: Williams
&Norgate, 1889-1891), I, II, Appendix.
68

R.E. Park, 'The City as a Social Laboratory,' in T.V. Smith and

L.D. White, eds., Chicago: An Experiment in Social Science Research
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), 46.
69W.I. Thomas, Social Behavior and Personality, ed. E.H. Volkart
(New York: Social Science Research Council, 1951), 89 footnote 3,
93-94; see Michael Parenti, 'Introduction to the Torchbook Edition,'
in Thomas, The Unadjusted Girl (New York: Harper & Row, 1967),
viii-xxi.
70

W.F. Whyte, Street Corner Society, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1955) , appendix.
71

i.2. Szasz, Mythcf Mental Illness (New York: Tell, 1967), and
Ideolo&7 and Insanity (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co.,
P.Laing, Self and Others, rev. ed. (I;ew York: Pantheon
].
190();
Books, 1973.
7
2Lee,'On Contexi and Relevance,' in Glenn Jacobs,ed., The Participant Observer (New York: George Braziller, 19?ji,' 3-16.

IJacobs, ibid., ix.
-

7

Ij~-

